Behavioral Circumscription and the Folk Psychology of Belief: A Study in Ethno-Mentalizing [forthcoming in Thought] David Rose Rutgers University drose@philosophy.rutgers.edu Edouard Machery University of Pittsburgh machery@pitt.edu Stephen Stich Rutgers University stich.steve@gmail.com Mario Alai University of Urbino mario.alai@libero.it Adriano Angelucci University of Urbino adriano.angelucci@uniurb.it Renatas Berniūnas Vilnius University renatasberniunas@gmail.com Emma E. Buchtel The Education University of Hong Kong buchtel@eduhk.hk 2 Amita Chatterjee Jadavpur University chatterjeeamita@gmail.com Hyundeuk Cheon Ewha Womans University hdcheon@gmail.com In-Rae Cho Seoul National University ircho@snu.ac.kr Daniel Cohnitz Utrecht University d.cohnitz@uu.nl Florian Cova University of Geneva florian.cova@gmail.com Vilius Dranseika Vilnius University, Lithuania vilius.dranseika@fsf.vu.lt Ángeles Eraña Lagos Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM mael@filosoficas.unam.mx Laleh Ghadakpour Iran laleh@ghadakpour.net 3 Maurice Grinberg New Bulgarian University mgrinberg@ngu.bg Ivar Hannikainen Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro ivar.hannikainen@gmail.com Takaaki Hashimoto University of Tokyo hshmt@l.u-tokyo.ac.jp Amir Horowitz Open University of Israel amirho@openu.ac.il Evgeniya Hristova New Bulgarian University ehristova@cogs.nbu.bg Yasmina Jraissati American University of Beirut yasmina.jraissati@gmail.com Veselina Kadreva New Bulgarian University vkadreva@nbu.bg Kaori Karasawa University of Tokyo 4 karasawa@l.u-tokyo.ac.jp Hackjin Kim Korea University hackjinkim@korea.ac.kr Yeonjeong Kim Carnegie Mellon University yeonjeongkim@cmu.edu Minwoo Lee Korea University, Seoul redooly86@gmail.com Carlos Mauro Católica Porto Business School cmauro72@gmail.com Masaharu Mizumoto Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology mizumoto@jaist.ac.jp Sebastiano Moruzzi University of Bologna sebastiano.moruzzi@unibo.it Christopher Y. Olivola Carnegie Mellon University olivola@cmu.edu Jorge Ornelas 5 Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí jornelass@gmail.com Barbara Osimani Ludwig-Maximilians Univesität, München – MCMP B.Osimani@lmu.de Carlos Romero UNAM ckronosz@hotmail.com Alejandro Rosas National University of Colombia arosasl@unal.edu.co Massimo Sangoi University of Urbino massimosangoi@hotmail.com Andrea Sereni Scuola Universitaria Superiore IUSS Pavia andrea.sereni@iusspavia.it Sarah Songhorian Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele Milano songhorian.sarah@unisr.it Paulo Sousa Institute of Cognition and Culture, Queen's University Belfast paulo.sousa@qub.ac.uk 6 Noel Struchiner Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro struchiner@gmail.com Vera Tripodi University of Turin vera.tripodi@unito.it Naoki Usui Mie University n.usui@human.mie-u.ac.jp Alejandro Vázquez del Mercado UNAM vazquezdelmercado@gmail.com Giorgio Volpe University of Bologna giorgio.volpe@unibo.it Hrag A. Vosgerichian American University of Beirut hav00@aub.edu.lb Xueyi Zhang Southeast University, P. R. China zxynj0928@126.com Jing Zhu Sun Yat-Sen University zhujing6@mail.sysu.edu.cn 7 In a well-known case of Capgras delusion, a patient asserts that his or her loved one has been replaced by an imposter, yet continues to eat, sleep, and live with the alleged imposter (e.g., Hirstein and Ramachandran, 1997). This is a striking case of "behavioral circumscription": A subject's assertion that p does not match her non-verbal behaviors. By contrast, what we will call "behavioral integration" occurs when a subject's assertion that p matches her non-verbal behaviors. Many philosophers have maintained that lay people refrain from ascribing belief in cases of behavioral circumscription (e.g., Bayne, 2010; Bortolotti 2012; Bortolotti and Mameli 2012; Egan, 2009; Frankish 2012; Murphy 2012; Schwitzgebel 2001, 2010, 2012; Tumulty 2012). The severe behavioral circumscription present in typical cases of Capgras delusion suggests that the delusional attitude "fail[s] to play the functional role that is essential to a state's being a belief" (Bayne 2010, p. 330) and "the practice of belief ascription start[s] to break down" (Schwitzgebel, 2012, p. 16). Some have held that the relevant folk psychological attitude present in the Capgras-delusion and similar cases is imagination (e.g., Currie 2000; Currie and Jureidini 2001; Currie and Ravenscroft 2002). Others have held that no familiar folk psychological attitude captures the relevant attitude displayed in these cases and that we need some gerrymandered attitude, such as "bimagination", a mix of belief and imagination, to capture the relevant attitude (Egan, 2009). Still others have held that while severe behavioral circumscription counts against classifying the attitude displayed in these cases as belief, the attitude is nonetheless belief-like, perhaps an instance of "anomalous" belief, "in-between belief," or the like (e.g., Bortolotti, 2012; Reimer, 2010; Tumulty, 2012; Schwitzgebel, 2012). But while many philosophers hold that behavioral integration is necessary for the folk ascription of belief-and so behavioral circumscription undermines belief ascription-they have not offered any empirical evidence in support of this claim. We doubt that behavioral circumscription undermines belief ascription in folk psychology. Our doubt is encouraged by the results reported in Rose, Buckwalter, and Turri (2014) who found that the folk 8 overwhelmingly attribute belief in cases of Capgras delusion. This suggests that non-linguistic behavior sometimes doesn't count as evidence for or against the possession of a belief. But why might nonlinguistic behavior fail to count as evidence for or against the possession of a belief? Our view is that non-linguistic behavior sometimes doesn't count as evidence for or against the possession of a belief because the type of evidence that is required for the ascription of belief is lexicographically ordered: Assertions are first taken into account, and when an agent sincerely asserts that p, non-linguistic behavioral evidence is disregarded. If an agent does not make any assertion or if it is not clear whether her assertion is sincere, non-linguistic behavioral evidence is taken into account. And so in what follows, we'll present evidence that across twenty-two countries and seventeen languages behavioral circumscription does not undermine belief ascription in folk psychology. 1. Method and Participants We collected data from 5,788 people across twenty-six samples, spanning twenty-two countries. Each subject was randomly assigned to one of two conditions. They read one of two cases (we'll call them "Consistent" and "Inconsistent") based on Rose and colleagues (2014): Don and Katherine had been married for ten years. Like most married couples, they spent a lot of time together and did many things together. They regularly shared meals, went to the movies, lived in the same house, and slept in the same bed. Then one day, as Don was driving to the store, a car drove through a red light, hitting the driver side door of Don's car. Don suffered a traumatic brain injury as the result of the gruesome traffic accident. In the year following his injury, Don began what appeared to be a remarkable and speedy recovery. He regained his powers of speech, and his intelligence, as well as nearly all his cognitive and social skills. However there was something very strange about Don after his 9 accident: he would tell his friends, family and doctors that his wife, Katherine, had been replaced by an imposter. Consistent: In addition, Don now always refused to eat meals with her, go to the movies with her, and sleep in the same bed with her. Katherine was very surprised and saddened by the things Don would say. Inconsistent: Surprisingly, however, Don continued to always eat meals with her, go to the movies with her, live in the same house as her, and sleep in the same bed with her. Katherine was very surprised and saddened by the things Don would say. After reading one of these two cases, participants answered a comprehension question, followed by a question about what Don believes about his wife: Comprehension: According to the story, which of the following statements is correct? [Don tells his friends that his parents have been replaced by imposters/Don tells his friends that his wife has been replaced by an imposter.] Belief: Which option best reflects your personal opinion on the matter? [Don believes that Katherine is an imposter/Don does not believe that Katherine is an imposter.] The cases were translated into 17 languages and presented in the respective native language for each group (see Supplementary Mateerials). 2. Results 234 people answered Comprehension incorrectly. Demographics for the remaining participants are in Table 1. 10 Table 1. Demographic information about the study's participants who answered Comprehension correctly, including countries in which data were collected, nature of the sample (students vs. nonstudents), and mode of survey administration (paper-pencil vs. web-based, volunteers vs. in exchange of a compensation, language of the survey). Country Students? Method Payment Language N Europe Bulgaria N Webbased Volunteers Bulgarian 403 France N Webbased Compensation & volunteers French 429 Germany N Webbased Compensation German 209 Italy Y Paperpencil Volunteers Italian 198 Lithuania N Paperpencil Volunteers Lithuanian 205 Lithuania Y Paperpencil Volunteers Lithuanian 146 Portugal Y Paperpencil Volunteers Portuguese 181 Spain N Webbased Compensation Spanish 271 11 Switzerland N Paperpencil & webbased Volunteers French 50 Switzerland Y Paperpencil & webbased Compensation & volunteers French 26 UK N Webbased Compensation English 266 Middle East Iran N Paperpencil Volunteers Persian 200 Israel Y Webbased Volunteers Hebrew 179 Bedouin N Paperpencil Volunteers Arabic 50 Lebanon Y Webbased Volunteers English 164 Central & North America 12 Mexico N Paperpencil Volunteers Spanish 181 USA N Webbased Compensation English 248 South America Brazil Y Paperpencil Volunteers Portuguese 160 Colombia N Paperpencil Volunteers Spanish 135 East Asia China Y Paperpencil Volunteers Chinese, Simplified 181 China Y Paperpencil Volunteers Chinese, Simplified 164 China N Webbased Compensation Chinese, Simplified 215 Hong Kong Y Webbased Compensation Chinese, Traditional 192 Japan N Webbased Compensation Japanese 182 Japan Y Paperpencil Volunteers Japanese 206 South Korea N WebCompensation Korean 170 13 based Mongolia Y Paperpencil Volunteers Mongolian 170 South & Southeast Asia Indonesia Y Paperpencil Compensation Indonesian 189 India Y Paperpencil Volunteers Bengali 184 Analyzing responses from the remaining 5,554 participants, we found a small effect of behavioral circumscription on belief ascription, χ2(1, 5554)=128.675, p<.001, Cramer's V=.152, with the vast majority of individuals ascribing belief (91% in Consistent, 80% in Inconsistent) despite severe behavioral circumscription (see Figure 1).1 1 Throughout, for significant effects, we report effect sizes using Cramer's V, which is a nonparametric correlation coefficient that indicates the strength of the relationship between nominal variables. This measure delivers a value between 0 and 1. We follow Ellis (2010) for interpreting the magnitude of the effect sizes. So for Cramer's V we interpret values greater than or equal to .5 as large, greater than or equal to .3 but less than .5 as medium, and greater than or equal to .1 but less than .3 as small. 14 Figure 1: Overall Belief Ascription in the Consistent and Inconsistent Cases with 95% Confidence Intervals We then analyzed the effect of behavioral circumscription on belief ascription within each site. The results are depicted in Figure 2 (see also Table 1 in Supplementary Materials). 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Consistent Inconsistent Believes * * * * * ** ** ** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** * 15 Figure 2: Rates of Belief Ascription for Consistent and Inconsistent Cases for Each Site (*=p<.05, **=p<.01, ***=p<.001) In brief, we found that in all sites (except Iran and Guangzhou China) rates of belief ascription significantly exceeded chance (50%) even when non-linguistic behavior is at odds with a speaker's assertion (Table 2). Table 2: Test of Belief Attribution Against Chance (50%) in Both Consistent and Inconsistent Cases for Each Site (*=p<.05, **=p<.01, ***=p<.001) Sample Consistent (χ2) (p-value) Inconsistent (χ2) (p-value) Central and North America Mexico 53.481 *** 56.627 *** USA 120.032 *** 90.613 *** South America Colombia 59.853 *** 32.267 *** Brazil 65.120 *** 28.800 *** 16 Europe Bulgaria 115.200 *** 84.166 *** France 105.140 *** 139.205 *** Germany 59.259 *** 25.752 *** Italy 91.162 *** 32.818 *** Lithuania 91.124 *** 46.522 *** Portugal 66.618 *** 31.696 *** Spain 113.400 *** 87.397 *** Switzerland 17.065 *** 24.200 *** UK 120.273 *** 71.672 *** Middle East Iran 16.000 *** .160 .689 Bedouin 8.333 15.969 17 ** *** Israel 58.778 *** 75.469 *** Lebanon 54.084 *** 10.383 ** East Asia China 60.297 *** 17.695 *** Hong Kong 62.082 *** 35.787 *** Guangzhou China 74.075 *** 3.169 .075 Mainland China 75.872 *** 48.906 *** Japan 140.247 *** 66.305 *** South Korea 66.780 *** 22.000 *** Mongolia 65.190 *** 10.465 ** South Asia Indonesia 48.269 *** 40.042 *** 18 India 61.813 *** 34.935 *** Participants sampled from Iran attributed belief less frequently in both the consistent and inconsistent cases. While the majority attributed belief in the consistent case, people were divided in the inconsistent case. A somewhat similar pattern occurred with participants sampled from Guangzhou China, though the majority in the inconsistent case attributed belief at rates that marginally exceeded chance (see Table 2). The key point, however, for present purposes is this: their practice of belief attribution is not "breaking down" in the way we would expect if behavioral integration were a necessary feature of belief. They may be somewhat ambivalent, but they are clearly not denying belief in the way we would expect if behavioral integration was necessary for belief ascription in folk psychology. 3. Discussion We have found that in many countries, across many languages, once a speaker has sincerely asserted that p, people do not refrain from ascribing belief when non-linguistic behavior is at odds with the possession of a belief that p: in fact, once a speaker sincerely asserts that p, non-linguistic behavioral evidence seems to be largely disregarded.2 Our results dramatically extend the findings from Rose and colleagues (2014) for USA participants. Of course our results do not mean that non-linguistic behavior never counts as evidence for or against the possession of a belief. When an agent does not assert anything, her behavior is often telling. What the data suggests is that the types of evidence for the ascription of a belief are, at least in some circumstances, lexicographically ordered: sincere assertions are first taken into account, and when an agent sincerely asserts that p, non-linguistic behavioral evidence is disregarded. If an agent does not make any assertion, 2 We informally polled 25 English speaking informants and all of them said it was likely that the speaker in our Capgras cases was sincere. We also asked some research partners who conducted the research in other languages whether they thought speakers of that language would regard the statement by Don in the Capgras cases as sincere. They said it was likely that speakers of these respective languages think that the speaker in our Capgras cases was sincere. 19 non-linguistic behavioral evidence is then taken into account. (Various types of non-linguistic behavioral evidence may also be lexicographically ordered, but our data does not speak to that question.) We also find that rates of belief ascription are high across virtually every site despite severe behavioral circumscription. This is not at all what we would expect if behavioral integration was necessary for belief ascription in the folk psychology of belief. Sincere assertions and non-linguistic behavior seem lexically ordered in the twenty-two sites we collected data from. Some of our data come from students, others from non-student populations. While most data sets come from industrialized societies, two data sets come from traditional societies: the Bedouin in Israel and the Nasa People of Colombia. The upshot is that we may have discovered a universal principle of folk psychology that psychologists and philosophers of cognitive science working on mindreading have so far ignored: behavioral evidence and sincere assertions are lexicographically ordered. Naturally, further cross-cultural and cross-linguistic research is needed to further support this claim, but the scope of our enquiry provides strong support for our hypothesis about universality. We did find that behavioral circumscription produced an effect in 16 of the 26 (61.5%) sites examined (see Figure 2 and Supplementary Materials), but this effect is typically small: Of those 16 sites, 14 (87.5%) displayed a small effect of behavioral circumscription on belief ascription (see Figures 3 and 4). 20 Figure 3: Difference in Rates of Belief Attribution Between Consistent and Inconsistent Cases 21 Figure 4: Effect Size (Using Cramer's V) of Behavioral Circumscription on Belief Attribution for Each Site3 Participants sampled from Mongolia and from Guangzhou in China displayed a moderate effect of behavioral circumscription on belief ascription (a 27% difference in Mongolia; a 34% difference in Guangzhou), but the majority of participants in Mongolia attributed belief despite severe behavioral circumscription (see Table 2). Moreover, those in Guangzhou China attributed belief at rates that marginally exceeded chance in the inconsistent case (see Table 2). That said, it may be that a minority of varying size, depending perhaps on culture and language (see Figures 3 and 4), does not lexicographically order sincere assertion and non-linguistic behavior to ascribe beliefs. To conclude, taken together, our results suggest that behavioral integration is not a necessary feature of belief in folk psychology: People tend to ascribe beliefs when non-linguistic behavior is at odds or in line with sincere assertions, though the rate does vary depending on the culture and language. 4. Objections and Responses 4.1 BELIEF is not a Universal Concept Proponents of Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) have argued that in contrast to KNOW, BELIEF is not a universal concept, a "semantic prime" in their terminology (e.g., Wierzbicka, 2006, Ch. 7).4 It can't thus be that we have discovered a universal principle governing the ascription of beliefs in folk psychology. The NSM claim that many languages lack a term for "belief" raises deep questions about synonymy and translation. If the NSM claim were true, then many of our translations would be defective. We are inclined to think that the NSM view on what is required for synonymy and translation is far too stringent. But this is not the place to defend that view. Instead, we can simply make clear that our claim is about 3 See fn. 1 on benchmarks for interpreting Cramer's V. 4 We use small caps to denote concepts. 22 standard translations, the sorts that are provided by dictionaries and expert translators. We maintain that behavioral integration is not necessary for belief attribution in English, nor is it necessary for the attribution of the standard translation of "belief" in a wide range of languages from quite different language groups. This is impressive evidence that the phenomenon is universal, though since there are about 6000 extant languages, it is entirely possible that behavioral integration is necessary for the standard translation of "belief" in one or more of those languages. Finally, we would add that even if the NSM claim is right, it is still the case that that we have discovered a universal principle governing the ascription of beliefs in folk psychology where BELIEF is acquired. 4.2 Limitations of the Vignette One could object that our failure to find behavioral circumscription preventing belief ascription is simply due to the shortcomings of our vignette. We concede that this is a possibility. However, to be in a position to take this objection seriously, we would need to know how exactly the vignette we used prevents the influence of behavioral circumscription on belief ascription to manifest itself. Furthermore, this vignette is based on cases extensively discussed in the philosophical literature on belief, namely, typical cases of Capgras delusion. 4.3 Sincerity One could challenge our conclusion that behavioral circumscription does not prevent belief ascription by insisting that when we decide whether someone makes a sincere assertion and thus believe what she seems to say, we do pay attention to how this person behaves. How could it be, then, that when behavior and speech conflict we simply overlook behavior? We sometimes do pay attention to behavior to assess sincerity, but, first, we often do not need to appeal to non-linguistic behavioral evidence to decide whether an assertion is sincere: For instance, we may be told 23 that a speaker sincerely asserted that p or the conversational context may imply that her assertion was sincere. Second, the issue of interest among philosophers debating about belief ascription and the nature of belief is not whether we overlook behavior when it conflicts with speech in general. Rather, the issue of interest is whether people who sincerely assert that p believe that p even when their non-linguistic behavior is at odds with believing that p. And in these cases, such as cases of Capgras delusion, the evidence does suggest that in folk psychology the kind of evidence required for the ascription of belief is lexicographically ordered. 5. Conclusion Many philosophers hold that behavioral integration plays a necessary role in the folk psychology of belief. Our results suggest that this view is badly mistaken. Despite being confronted with a case involving severe behavioral circumscription-the case of Capgras delusion-people across a wide range of cultures and languages overwhelmingly attribute belief (in all but, at most, two sites examined out of 26 sites in 22 countries), and nowhere did we find a dramatic effect of behavioral circumscription on belief ascription. One key lesson then from these cross-cultural results is that it seems to be a crosscultural folk-psychological universal that behavioral integration is not required for belief ascription. What explains our results? We propose that sincere assertions and non-linguistic behavior are lexicographically ordered: When a speaker sincerely asserts that p, we tend to ascribe to her the belief that p whether or not her non-linguistic behavior reflects that belief. Our cross-cultural and cross-linguistic findings suggest that this principle governing belief ascription may well be a universal, although we also find some variation across sites in the size of the minority of people taking behavioral circumscription into account while ascribing belief. Future research could examine whether this principle governing belief 24 ascription is robust, extending to other kinds of delusion cases (e.g., Cotard delusion, paranoid schizophrenia, etc.) and non-delusional cases (e.g., religious belief, implicit racism).5 References Bayne, T. 2010. Delusions as Doxastic States: Contexts, Compartments, and Commitments, Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17/4: 329–336. Bortolotti, L. 2012. In Defense of Modest Doxasticism About Delusions, Neuroethics 5/1: 39-53. Bortolotti, L. and M. Mameli 2012. Self-deception, Delusion and the Boundaries of Folk Psychology, Humana.Mente 20: 203–221. Buckwalter, Rose and Turri. 2015. Belief Through Thick and Thin. Noûs, 49/4: 748-775. Currie, G. 2000. Imagination, Delusion and Hallucinations, in Pathologies of Belief, eds. Max Coltheart and Martin Davies, Blackwell. Currie, G. and J. Jureidini 2001. Delusion, Rationality, Empathy, Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 8/2-3:159-62. Currie, G. and I. Ravenscroft 2002. Recreative Minds: Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford University Press. Egan, A. 2009. Imagination, Delusion, and Self-deception, in Delusions, Self-deception, and Affective Influences on Belief Formation, eds. Tim Bayne and Jordi Fernandez, Psychology Press: 263-279. 5 We would like to thank John Turri, Wesley Buckwalter and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. This publication was made possible through the support of a grant from the Fuller Theological Seminary / Thrive Center in concert with the John Templeton Foundation. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Fuller Thrive Center or the John Templeton Foundation. 25 Ellis, Paul 2010. The Essential Guide to Effect Sizes: Statistical Power, Meta-Analysis and the Interpretation of Research Results. Cambridge University Press. Frankish, K. 2012. Delusions, Levels of Belief, and Non-doxastic Acceptances, Neuroethics 5/1: 23-27. Hirstein, W., and V.S. Ramachandran (1997. Capgras syndrome: a novel probe for understanding the neural representation of the identity and familiarity of persons, Proceedings of the. Royal Society of London B264: 437-44. Murphy, D. 2012. The Folk Epistemology of Delusions, Neuroethics 5/1: 19-22. Reimer, M. 2010. Only a Philosopher or a Madman: Impractical Delusions in Philosophy and Psychiatry, Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17/4: 315–328. Rose, D., Buckwalter, W., and Turri, J. 2014. When Words Speak Louder Than Actions: Delusion, Belief and the Power of Assertion. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 92/4: 1-18. Schwitzgebel, E. 2001. In-between Believing, The Philosophical Quarterly 51/202: 76–82. Schwitzgebel, E. 2010. Acting Contrary to Our Professed Beliefs, Or the Gulf Between Occurrent Judgment and Dispositional Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 91/4: 531-553. Schwitzgebel, E. 2012. Mad Belief? Neuroethics, 5/1: 13–17. Wierzbicka, A. 2006. English Meaning and Culture. Oxford University Press. 26 Supplementary Materials Table 1: Effect of Behavioral Circumscription on Belief Ascription for Each Site (*=p<.05, **=p<.01, ***=p<.001) Sample N χ2 p-value Cramer's V Central and North America Mexico 181 .683 .408 .061 USA 248 6.669 * .164 South America Colombia 135 2.634 .105 .140 Brazil 160 6.632 * .204 Europe Bulgaria 403 6.681 * .129 France 429 2.664 .103 .079 Germany 209 4.779 * .151 Italy 198 17.795 *** .299 Lithuania 351 5.697 * .127 Portugal 181 7.353 ** .202 27 Spain 271 1.797 .180 .081 Switzerland 76 .003 .957 .006 UK 266 11.390 ** .207 Middle East Iran 200 10.004 ** .224 Bedouin 50 1.691 .193 .184 Israel 179 .117 .732 .026 Lebanon 164 12.584 *** .277 East Asia China 181 12.170 *** .259 Hong Kong 192 3.082 .079 .127 Guangzhou China 164 29.060 *** .421 Mainland China 215 3.060 .080 .119 Japan 388 20.693 *** .231 South Korea 170 13.266 *** .279 Mongolia 170 19.228 *** .336 South Asia Indonesia 189 .492 .483 .051 28 India 184 4.230 * .152 Translations 1. Arabic A. Consistent 29 B. Inconsistent 30 2. Bulgarian A. Consistent 31 B. Inconsistent 32 3. Chinese Traditional A. Consistent 33 B. Inconsistent 34 4. Chinese Simplified A. Consistent 35 B. Inconsistent 36 5. French A. Consistent 37 B. Inconsistent 38 6. German A. Consistent 39 B. Inconsistent 40 7. Hebrew A. Consistent 41 B. Inconsistent 42 8. Indonesian A. Consistent 43 B. Inconsistent 44 9. Italian A. Consistent 45 B. Inconsistent 46 10. Japanese A. Consistent 47 B. Inconsistent 48 11. Korean A. Consistent 49 B. Inconsistent 50 12. Lithuanian A. Consistent 51 B. Inconsistent 52 13. Mongolian A. Consistent 53 B. Inconsistent 54 14. Persian A. Consistent 55 B. Inconsistent 56 15. Portuguese A. Consistent 57 B. Inconsistent 58 16. Spanish A. Consistent 59 B. Inconsistent 60 17. Bengali A. Consistent 61 B. Inconsistent